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PREEMPTION AND THE PUBLIC HEALTH: HOW WYETH v. LEVINE STANDS 
TO CHANGE THE WAYS IN WHICH WE IMPLEMENT HEALTH POLICY 
SHANE LEVESQUE* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
On April 7, 2000, Diana Levine, a Vermont musician who operated a 
children’s record label, visited a local health center for the treatment of a 
migraine headache,1 as she had many times before.2  There, Levine was 
administered two doses of the drug Phenergan, an anti-nausea medication 
manufactured and distributed by Wyeth Pharmaceuticals.3  The first of these 
was performed by means of intramuscular injection.4  However, because the 
initial dose proved ineffective against her migraine-related nausea, Levine 
returned to the center, where she received a second, intravenous injection of 
the medication by means of the “IV-push” method whereby the drug was 
injected directly into a vein in her arm through the use of a syringe.5  During 
the second injection, Phenergan entered Levine’s artery, either because the 
syringe’s needle punctured an artery or because the Phenergan escaped the 
vein into which it was administered and penetrate surrounding tissues.6  As a 
result, Levine developed gangrene, which required doctors to amputate her 
entire right forearm, causing her to lose her career as a professional 
musician.7 
At the time that Levine received this treatment, Wyeth had for years 
known that Phenergan, if allowed to come into contact with arterial blood, 
 
* J.D., Saint Louis University School of Law, 2009.  Doctoral student in Bioethics, Saint Louis 
University.  This paper would not have been possible without the mentorship of Professor 
Frederic Bloom, the generous guidance of Elizabeth Pendo, and the excellent research 
assistance provided by Lynn Hartke. 
 1. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1191 (2009); Levine v. Am. Home Prods., Inc., 
No. 670-12-01, 2004 WL 5456809, at *1 (Vt. Super. July 30, 2004). 
 2. Miriam Hill, When Can a Drug Consumer Sue?, PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov. 2, 2008, at 
C1. 
 3. Levine v. Wyeth, 944 A.2d 179, 182 (Vt. 2006). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1191. 
 7. Id. 
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would make the development of gangrene “likely.”8  In fact, the drug’s label 
expressly warned of this risk, and stated that because of it, it was “usually 
preferable” to administer the drug by means of the “IV-drip” method, 
because it presented a reduced chance of introducing the drug to the 
arterial system.9  However, Levine argued that the label did not 
contraindicate all methods of administration other than the IV-push 
method.10  In 2004, after reaching a settlement with the health center and 
the physician who oversaw the administration of the drug, Levine brought an 
action for damages against Wyeth after discovering that the 
pharmaceuticals company knew the risk of using the IV-push method in 
conjunction with Phenergan, but nonetheless failed to amend its labeling to 
eliminate what was known to be a very risky method of administration.11  
Consequently, she argued, Wyeth should be held liable under common-law 
products liability theories for its failure to adequately warn of the risks 
associated with that injection method, which she argued was “not 
reasonably safe for intravenous administration because the foreseeable risks 
of gangrene and loss of limb are great in relation to the drug’s therapeutic 
benefits.”12 
In response, Wyeth argued that the Vermont court should dismiss the 
case, stating that Levine’s state products liability claims were preempted by 
Food and Drug Administration determinations that the drug’s labeling was 
adequate.13  Despite its assertion, a Vermont jury agreed with Levine, 
awarding her $7.4 million dollars, which the court reduced to $6.7 
million.14  Following an unsuccessful series of appeals in Vermont state 
courts,15 Wyeth appealed to the United States Supreme Court, again 
arguing that Levine’s state-law claims were preempted by the FDA’s 
determination that the drug’s labeling was adequate.16  If plaintiffs were 
allowed to pursue such claims against drug manufacturers, Wyeth argued, 
not only would it be impossible for companies to comply with both federal 
and state requirements for prescription pharmaceuticals labeling, it would 
also frustrate the FDA’s ability to fully execute its duty to successfully oversee 
the safety of those drugs that have been introduced to the marketplace.17  
This, it asserted, would be a necessary consequence if layperson juries were 
 
 8. Levine, 944 A.2d at 183 n.1. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at 182. 
 11. Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1191-92; Hill, supra note 2. 
 12. Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1191-92. 
 13. Levine, 944 A.2d at 183-84. 
 14. Id. at 182-83. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1193-94. 
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allowed to substitute their judgment regarding what labeling is adequate for 
the specialized knowledge of an expert agency.18  The Court, however, 
agreed with Levine, holding first that Wyeth’s impossibility argument was 
entirely without merit since federal law allowed the company to amend its 
labeling at any time so long as it notified the FDA of the changes.19  
Second, the Court held not only that state-law tort claims did not pose an 
obstacle to the objectives of Congress, but also that any attempts by the 
FDA to interpret the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) as granting 
preemptive authority to the agency over such claims “relie[d] on an 
untenable interpretation of congressional intent and an overbroad view of 
an agency’s power to pre-empt state law.”20 
Although the parties in Wyeth may be relatively new actors, the story 
they tell has been told with increasing frequency throughout the course of 
the last few decades, and has become all-too-familiar fare to followers of 
constitutional law and political theory.  This tale, like the ones that come 
before it, pits state sovereignty against federal supremacy in an ever-
increasing struggle between federalization and federalism.  It describes the 
profound tension that exists between the ideals of Democratic rulemaking 
and public health protectionism.  And, perhaps most importantly, it forces its 
observers to consider what role, if any, courts should play in setting into 
motion the agendas of public health advocates. 
Part II of this Article begins with a discussion of how state tort claims 
have, from an historical perspective, been used to institute new public health 
policy by means of indirect regulation, paying specific attention to the 
ongoing debate regarding whether this use of the court system is an 
appropriate exercise of judicial power.  Because of its sheer power, and its 
history of use as a means of precluding state-law tort suits, Part III follows 
with a description of the general themes embodied in federal preemption 
jurisprudence.  Part IV addresses the often-tangled intersection between 
federal administrative agency action and preemption, and uses the several 
ways in which FDA has viewed its own preemptive authority as a means of 
demonstrating the vast confusion that results.  Finally, Part V of this Article 
concludes that, because of Wyeth’s implications for both federal preemption 
jurisprudence, its outcome has not only affirmed the ways in which the 
courts have been used a means of achieving indirect regulation of one of 
the nation’s leading industries, but also stands to change the ways in which 
public health policy in general is implemented within the United States. 
 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 1199. 
 20. Id. 
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II.  THE USE OF STATE-LAW TORT CLAIMS AS A METHOD OF REGULATING FOR THE 
PUBLIC HEALTH 
In incredibly general terms, a tort can be defined as a “civil, non-
contractual wrong for which an injured person or group of persons seeks a 
remedy in the form of monetary damages.”21  These wrongs are litigated in 
private, as opposed to public, forums, and typically result in legal, rather 
than equitable, relief.22  Throughout the course of American history, tort law 
has, in addition to being used as a tool for compensating individuals for the 
legal wrongs committed against them by others, proved an effective means 
of regulating for the public health.23  Through the use of state-law tort 
claims, the nation’s courts have played a consistent and significant role in 
the formulation of public health policy, in large part because of the nature 
of the law of negligence and the inherent effect of negligence on the health 
of actors other than the negligent party.24  In addition to compensating 
innocent actors for the injuries sustained as a result of another’s negligent 
acts, state-law tort claims also serve an important deterrent function.25  In 
fact, the imposition of civil liability on individuals as a means of punishing 
and preventing the wrongful infliction of injury on another is known to have 
a direct effect on rates of injury within the public, causing one commentator 
to aptly state that, “when the first common law court determined that an 
individual was liable for an action endangering another, public health policy 
was made.”26 
To that end, although there is no universally accepted list of the tort 
system’s general goals, four have emerged in regard to the use of tort law 
as a means of indirect regulation for the public health.  These include the 
“(1) assignment of responsibility to individuals or businesses that impose 
unreasonable risks causing injury or disease; (2) compensation of persons 
for loss caused by the conduct of individuals or businesses; (3) deterrence of 
unreasonably hazardous conduct; and (4) encouragement of innovation in 
product design, packaging, labeling, and advertising to reduce the risk of 
injury or disease.”27 
These articulated goals reflect the recognition that the tort system has 
proven to be an incredibly effective means of creating and implementing 
 
 21. LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 269 (2000). 
 22. Id. 
 23. See id. at 270 (“[T]ort law can be an extremely effective method of advancing the 
public’s health.”). 
 24. See id. at 288-89. 
 25. Id. at 288. 
 26. Wendy E. Parmet, Tobacco, HIV, and the Courtroom: The Role of Affirmative 
Litigation in the Formation of Public Health Policy, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 1663, 1665 (1999). 
 27. GOSTIN, supra note 21, at 270. 
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wide-ranging public health policy.28  Decades in the recent past have given 
rise to new strategies for using state-law tort claims as a means of regulating 
for the public health that are both powerful and highly sophisticated.29  Not 
only did the last half of the Twentieth Century see the birth of the toxic tort,30 
it also saw the rise of the mass tort—also known as the class action 
lawsuit.31  And while the primary objective of these legal innovations has, 
arguably, continued to focus on winning compensation for the unlawful 
injuries suffered by plaintiffs, the effects of their “secondary” purpose—that 
of indirect regulation of industries by means of the judicial system—have 
been nothing short of great.32 
The sizeable judgments that often result from successful litigation against 
large companies whose actions affect the public health have proven 
effective means of indirectly regulating industries because of the incredibly 
financial pressure they impose.  Businesses, which have fiduciary duties to 
maximize profits for their shareholders, are more likely to steer clear of 
behaviors when there exist substantial risks of financial loss that outweigh 
any foreseen benefit.  After all, “[i]t matters to a business whether it must 
bear the cost of. . .personal injury.”33  The result is that adverse judgments 
in tort incentivize increased industry attention to product safety measures, or 
even the complete withdrawal from the market of those products that cannot 
be made safe for human use.34  In some cases, though, a company may 
elect to pass the costs of any litigation on to the consumer through pricing 
increases.35  This sort of activity may “powerfully affect consumer choice and 
action” to such a degree that consumers are increasingly deterred from 
consuming those products that the courts have deemed unsafe.36  The result 
 
 28. See id. (describing tort litigation as “an effective tool to reduce the burden of injury 
and disease”). 
 29. See Parmet, supra note 26, at 1666-67 (discussing “toxic tort,” automobile, and 
children toy litigation as forms of tort litigation that create public health policy). 
 30. See id. at 1666; Robert F. Blomquist, American Toxic Tort Law: An Historical 
Background, 1979-87, 10 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 85, 85-86 (1992) (In re Agent Orange 
Products Liability Litigation, decided in 1979, was the first major toxic tort case.). 
 31. See generally Richard A. Nagareda, Turning from Tort to Administration, 94 MICH. L. 
REV. 899, 899 (1996) (offering a detailed explanation of the mass tort litigation system and its 
use as an indirect method of regulating industries). 
 32. See GOSTIN, supra note 21, at 270 (noting that “civil litigation [redresses] many 
different kinds of public health harms”). 
 33. Id. at 289. 
 34. Id. at 270, 304. 
 35. Id. at 288-89, 304. 
 36. Id. at 288. 
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is that consumption is driven down, which itself has a direct effect on the 
public health.37 
Viewed in this way, it becomes increasingly clear that tort law can be 
one of the sharpest weapons in the arsenal for those who wish to bring into 
effect powerful, yet indirect, regulation of industry for the purpose of fulfilling 
public health objectives; however, despite its flexibility, tort law is no gentle 
giant.  In addition to the great good it can bring about, it also has the 
potential to profoundly disrupt or otherwise harm the public health.  First, as 
discussed, adverse tort verdicts against industries may have the effect of 
driving up production costs.  Some of those industries affected by these 
judgments may choose to pass on the costs of litigation not to their 
customers, but to their own employees by eliminating positions, reducing 
pay, or through the withdrawal of health care benefits.38  Because of the fact 
that socioeconomic status and health are so inextricably interwoven,39 critics 
argue, it becomes increasingly important to consider the broader potential 
effects of indirect regulation through tort.40  Others argue that, when large 
judgments in tort are levied against industries, it has the effect of smothering 
the innovation and growth of those services and goods that are desirable 
and good for the American people.41 
A. Indirect Regulation Illustrated: The Tobacco Litigation and the Public 
Health 
There is, perhaps, no better example of how state tort claims have been 
used to set public health directives into motion than those presented by the 
series of lawsuits and settlements that have collectively come to be known as 
the “tobacco litigation.”42  Separated by scholars into three waves,43 the 
tobacco litigation began as an exercise in futility.  The first two waves, which 
began in 1954 and ended in the early 1990s, were marked by the abject 
failure of plaintiffs to secure victories against the tobacco industry, despite 
the fact that the risks associated with the use of tobacco were becoming 
 
 37. GOSTIN, supra note 21, at 289 (noting that this was the case with youth’s cigarette 
use). 
 38. Id. at 304. 
 39. Robert A. Hahn et al., Poverty and Death in the United States—1973 and 1991, 6 
EPIDEMIOLOGY 490, 490 (1995). 
 40. GOSTIN, supra note 21, at 304. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 291. 
 43. See Robert L. Rabin, A Sociolegal History of the Tobacco Tort Litigation, 44 STAN. L. 
REV. 853, 854 (1992); Parmet, supra note 26, at 1672-78. 
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increasingly well known.44  However, in 1994, confidential documents 
belonging to the Brown and Williamson Tobacco Company were leaked to 
the public.45  These documents, which came to be known as the “Tobacco 
Papers,” contained evidence that the tobacco industry was not only aware of 
the dangers associated with smoking and nicotine’s addictive properties, but 
also that it had every intention of keeping that information from the public.46  
With this revelation, the “third wave” of tobacco litigation began in 
earnest.47 
What followed was a flurry of litigation.  First, state attorneys general 
sued the tobacco industry for the reimbursement of state medical 
expenditures made in the care of individuals with tobacco-related 
diseases.48  The settlement agreements that resulted from that litigation 
included over $200 billion in compensation to states, instituted new 
standards for the advertising and promotion of tobacco products, precluded 
tobacco companies from sponsoring sporting events, disbanded the Council 
for Tobacco Research, and created a foundation dedicated to preventing 
adolescent smoking.49  Inspired by the staggering financial impact the state 
suits had on the tobacco industry,50 as well as the huge strides in regulating 
an industry that manufactured a product that was hazardous to human 
health, but that had ironically been subjected to little regulation by the 
federal government,51 other actors began to follow the example provided by 
the states.52  Before long, the tobacco industry was fielding lawsuits filed by 
 
 44. Parmet, supra note 26, at 1672-73 (explaining that, despite a Surgeon General’s 
report offering proof that cigarette smoking was hazardous to the public’s health, no plaintiff 
was successful in private litigation against a tobacco company). 
 45. John Slade et al., Nicotine and Addiction: The Brown and Williamson Documents, 
274 JAMA 225, 225 (1995). 
 46. Id. at 232. 
 47. See Parmet, supra note 26, at 1676; Peter D. Jacobson & Kenneth E. Warner, 
Litigation and Public Health Policy Making: The Case of Tobacco Control, 24 J. HEALTH POL. 
POL’Y & L. 769, 778-79 (1999) (noting that, in 1997, the tobacco industry reached multi-
billion dollar settlements with the states of Mississippi, Florida, and Texas, and in 1998 agreed 
to a $208 billion overall settlement with every other state). 
 48. The first of these claims was filed by the State of Mississippi in 1994, and was 
consequently joined by most other states.  See Settlement Agreement and Release, In re Mike 
Moore, Attorney General, ex rel. State of Miss. Tobacco Litig., No 94-1429 (Ch. Ct. Jackson 
Co., Miss. Oct. 17, 1997). 
 49. GOSTIN, supra note 21, at 295-96. 
 50. Id. at 296. 
 51. Although it was at one time listed in the 1890 edition of the U.S. Pharmacopoeia, 
tobacco was deleted from the 1905 edition, and thus escaped regulation under the 1906 
Food and Drug Act.  For an historical account of tobacco’s regulation within the United 
States, see Graham E. Kelder, Jr. & Richard A. Daynard, The Role of Litigation in the Effective 
Control of the Sale and Use of Tobacco, 8 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 63, 66-67 (1997). 
 52. GOSTIN, supra note 21, at 296. 
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the federal government,53 individuals and their families,54 and even foreign 
governments.55 
Public health advocates consider the tobacco litigation an overwhelming 
success, and count among its primary achievements the driving up of 
cigarette prices,56 a correlating reduction in consumption,57 and a less 
visible presence in American culture.58  However, this litigation was not 
without its associated costs.  Foremost among these, scholars argue, is the 
loss of inside information regarding tobacco use by the Council for Tobacco 
Research, which, despite being designed to serve the tobacco industry, 
provided the lion’s share of the damning information regarding tobacco that 
was used to secure judgments against manufacturers.59 
B. The Propriety of Indirect Regulation 
While it may be true that the use of tort verdicts is a powerful tool for 
effecting broad public health policy, there remains the question of whether 
such a use is in fact an appropriate exercise of judicial power.  Some may 
convincingly argue that verdicts affecting the legal behavior of individuals 
and entities in the absence of a legislative directive amounts to nothing 
 
 53. See, e.g., U.S. v. Philip Morris Inc., 116 F. Supp. 2d 131, 134 (D.D.C. 2000) 
(seeking repayment of Medicare funds used to treat individuals with tobacco-related diseases). 
 54. See, e.g., Henley v. Philip Morris Inc., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 494, 496 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2001) (confirming a trial court verdict of $25 million in punitive damages); Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco v. Carter, 723 So. 2d 833, 834 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998); Williams v. 
Philip Morris Inc., 127 P.3d 1165, 1167 (Or. 2006) (confirming a trial court verdict awarding 
$79.5 million to the family of a tobacco user). 
 55. See In re Tobacco/Governmental Health Care Costs, 83 F. Supp. 2d 125, 126 
(D.D.C. 1999); Republic of Pan. v. Am. Tobacco Co. Inc., 217 F.3d 343, 344 (5th Cir. 
2000); Republic of Venez. v. Philip Morris Co., 827 So. 2d 339, 340 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2002). 
 56. See JEFFREY E. HARRIS, THE PRICE OF CIGARETTES AND THE PROFITS OF CIGARETTE 
MANUFACTURERS WITH AND WITHOUT FEDERAL INTERVENTION, 1997-2006 5 (1998), available at 
http://web.mit.edu/jeffrey/harris/Harris_ACS_Report_May_1998.pdf (noting that the average 
price for a pack of cigarettes increased from $1.92 per pack in 1994 to $2.02 in 1996); Ctrs. 
for Disease Control & Prevention, Economic Facts About U.S. Tobacco Use and Tobacco 
Production, http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data_statistics/fact_sheets/economics/econ_facts/ 
index.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 2010) (noting that in 2008, the average price per pack of 
cigarettes was $4.35). 
 57. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, EARLY RELEASE OF SELECTED ESTIMATES BASED 
ON DATA FROM THE JANUARY-JUNE 2008 NATIONAL HEALTH INTERVIEW SURVEY 52 fig.8.1 (2008), 
available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhis/earlyrelease/200812_08.pdf (The Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention estimate that almost 25 percent of adults in the United 
States smoked in 1997, but that this percentage dropped to approximately 20 percent in 
2008.). 
 58. GOSTIN, supra note 21, at 297. 
 59. Id. 
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more than legislation from the bench by “philosopher king” judges, who use 
their positions of authority to substitute their personal normative 
determinations as to what ought to be the law, as opposed to what the law 
is.60 
Critics may then attack as undemocratic the use of the nation’s courts—
as opposed to the legislative process—as a means of putting into action 
public health agendas.61  This may be especially so when public health 
goals are realized as the result of an industry’s attempt to avoid civil liability, 
in which cases public health advocates may be criticized as having 
“evade[d] the legislative process” by “turning to the courts to establish 
policies when neither legislatures nor public health agencies have acted.”62 
While these criticisms are valid, it must be noted that the realities of 
human nature and the American political mechanism make the purely 
democratic process “neither responsive nor representative when it comes to 
public health.”63  One of these is the problem of public apathy: because 
individuals tend to frame health agendas on a personal, rather than on a 
population, level, they are less inspired to take action unless that action is 
calculated to address a personal concern that touches their own lives.64  
Another factor that limits the effectiveness of the legislative process in regard 
to public health is that, often, the industries that are subject to public health 
regulation wield immense political, financial, and social power, enabling 
them to engage in pushback against proposed legislation that is so strong 
that the ultimate effects of that legislation are fatally diminished.65  Taken 
together, these factors combine to create such an enormous obstacle for 
public health regulations that “it is not surprising that individuals concerned 
about public health threats have turned to the courts.”66 
III.  FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE LAWS 
While constitutional scholars may not see eye to eye on many points 
regarding the history and scope of federal preemption, most would agree 
 
 60. See John C. Eastman, Philosopher King Courts: Is the Exercise of Higher Law 
Authority Without a Higher Law Foundation Legitimate?, 54 DRAKE L. REV. 831, 847 (2006) 
(arguing against the legitimacy of independent, judicially imposed obligations designed to 
affect legal behavior). 
 61. See Parmet, supra note 26, at 1689. 
 62. Id. at 1690, 1691. 
 63. Id. at 1692. 
 64. Lawrence O. Gostin, Scott Burris & Zita Lazzarini, The Law and the Public’s Health: A 
Study of Infectious Disease Law in the United States, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 59, 89-90 (1999). 
 65. See Kelder & Daynard, supra note 51, at 68-69 (describing how tobacco companies 
capitalized upon their relationships with political officials to minimize the impact of tobacco 
regulations). 
 66. Parmet, supra note 26, at 1694. 
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that our contemporary formulation of the doctrine is at the very least 
“muddled.”67  Some commentators have gone so far as to describe it as an 
“awful mess,”68 “chaos,”69 or even “profound[ly] confusing.”70  Even 
Supreme Court justices have found themselves frustrated by the 
jurisprudential tangle, one proclaiming it a “crazy quilt,”71 and another 
stating that it is “difficult to apply.”72  It is perhaps because of this confusion 
that other, more easily navigated areas of constitutional law have 
traditionally upstaged the discussion of federal preemption.73  Its lack of 
popularity in the legal literature is made more acute by the fact that the 
doctrine is one of the most-used defenses in cases that pose a constitutional 
question.74 
Despite the fact that state-law tort claims serve as a powerful tool for 
effecting sweeping public health reform, federal preemption has proven to 
be an equally potent foil against those who wish to use the courts as a 
means of indirectly regulating industries.  Consequently, it is instructive to 
review the ways in which federal preemption has stood as an obstacle to 
those wishing to change the market behaviors of industries regulated by the 
federal government.  Although a complete reformulation of federal 
preemption jurisprudence is beyond the scope of this Article, the following 
Section endeavors to lay a foundation of bedrock principles upon which a 
basic understanding of the doctrine may be built.  To do so, it begins by 
defining federal preemption, paying particular attention to the constitutional 
basis for the doctrine and to the ways in which it has been applied 
throughout the past one hundred years. 
A. Preemption Defined 
The United States Constitution envisions a national system in which 
federal and state governments remain independent sovereigns “within their 
respective spheres.”75  However, this paradigm of “dual sovereignty”76 lies 
 
 67. Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 233 (2000). 
 68. Richard A. Bales, The Discord Between Collective Bargaining and Individual 
Employment Rights: Theoretical Origins and a Proposed Solution, 77 B.U. L. REV. 687, 702 
(1997). 
 69. Frank S. Alexander, Federal Intervention in Real Estate Finance: Preemption and 
Federal Common Law, 71 N.C. L. REV. 293, 340 (1993). 
 70. Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767, 768 
(1994). 
 71. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 542-43 (1992) (Blackmun, J., 
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part). 
 72. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 873 (2000). 
 73. Gardbaum, supra note 70, at 768. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 714 (1999). 
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in tension with the doctrine of federal preemption, which holds that states 
are relieved of their sovereign authority when Congress validly exercises an 
enumerated power, and in doing so indicates its intent to have the exclusive 
say in respect to a particular area of regulation or law.77  The Court has 
recognized the Supremacy Clause as the primary constitutional basis for 
federal preemption doctrine,78 which declares that the “Constitution, and the 
Laws of the United States. . .shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the 
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby. . . .”79  Consequently, “state 
law is naturally preempted to the extent of any conflict with a federal 
statute,”80 with the result that “any state law, however clearly within a State’s 
acknowledged power, which interferes with or is contrary to federal law, 
must yield.”81 
Preemption analysis, as with any consideration of the legality of a 
congressional act, begins with the threshold question of whether that act 
was done pursuant to a constitutional exercise of Congress’ enumerated 
powers.82  If not, the law is unconstitutional, with the result that the law is 
held to have no preemptive effect.83  If the federal law is constitutional, the 
analysis moves into its second phase, which turns largely on the question of 
whether Congress intended the federal law or scheme to preempt state 
authority.84 
The Court has stated that, when determining congressional intent to 
preempt state law within a realm that is traditionally regulated by the states, 
it “start[s] with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States 
were not intended to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the 
clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”85  This requirement of a “clear 
 
 76. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 919, 935 (1997). 
 77. Gardbaum, supra note 70, at 771. 
 78.  See Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs., 471 U.S. 707, 712-13 (1984) 
(stating that “[u]nder the Supremacy Clause . . . when acting within constitutional limits, 
Congress is empowered to pre-empt state law[s]” that contradict federal law). 
 79. U.S. CONST.  art. VI, cl. 2. 
 80. Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000). 
 81. Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138 (1988) (quoting Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 
666 (1962)). 
 82. David E. Engdahl, Preemptive Capability of Federal Power, 45 U. COLO. L. REV. 51, 
57-58 (1973). 
 83. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566 (1995) (holding unconstitutional 
a statute on the ground that it was not within Congress’s enumerated power to regulate 
commerce among the several states). 
 84. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (stating that “‘[t]he 
purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone’ of pre-emption analysis.”) (citing Malone v. 
White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978). 
 85. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (citing Napier v. Atlantic 
Coast Line, 272 U.S. 605, 611 (1926)). 
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and manifest” purpose has over the years come to be known as the 
“presumption against preemption,”86 which “provides assurance that ‘the 
federal-state balance’ will not be disturbed unintentionally by Congress or 
unnecessarily by the courts.”87 
Although the Court’s adherence to the presumption appears to wax and 
wane, legal scholars have been largely uniform in their support.88  This is so 
in the face of increasing challenges to the presumption, both scholarly89 and 
judicial.90  Despite these attacks, though, the presumption has remained a 
“part of hornbook law,” and thus has not fallen entirely by the wayside.91  
However, more troubling to public health advocates and proponents of 
 
 86. Allison H. Eid, Preemption and the Federalism Five, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 32 (2005).  To 
support her position, the author cites three cases in which Justice Stevens penned the majority 
opinion.  These include Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005), 
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485, 494 (1996), and Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 518.  In 
addition to these, the presumption against preemption has, during the last ten years, been 
discussed by the Court in Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1194-95, 1195 n.3 (2009), 
Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538, 553 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting), Riegel v. 
Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1013-14 (2008) (Ginsberg, J., dissenting), Watters v. 
Wachovia Bank, N. A., 550 U.S. 1, 31 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting), Merrill Lynch, Pierce, 
Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 86 (2006), Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 
274 (2006), Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 260-61 
(2004) (Souter, J., dissenting), Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 661-
62 (2003), New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 17-18 (2002), Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 
141, 151 (2001), Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 341, 347-48 
(2001), Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 374 n.8 (2000), Geier v. 
Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 888 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting), United States v. 
Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 107-08 (2000). 
 87. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977) (quoting United States v. Bass, 
404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971)). 
 88. Eid, supra note 86, at 33. 
 89. Nelson, supra note 67, at 232.  Professor Nelson argues that the Supremacy Clause 
is incompatible with the “artificial” presumption against preemption, because it establishes 
federal law as supreme:  “any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding.”  Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.).  He consequently argues that such 
a legal “presumption” must yield to the Supremacy Clause.  Id. 
 90. See ALAN E. UNTEREINER, THE PREEMPTION DEFENSE IN TORT ACTIONS: LAW, STRATEGY 
AND PRACTICE 31-32 (2008).  Untereiner posits that the Supreme Court has chosen to ignore 
the presumption against preemption on several occasions in recent years.  Id.  First, he points 
to Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1008, where the court relied on the plain meaning of an express 
preemption clause without ever addressing the presumption against preemption.  Id. at 33.  
Second, he describes how the Court similarly ignored the presumption against preemption in 
its consideration of an express preemption clause, despite the fact that the case involved the 
ability of an individual plaintiff to bring a tort action against a defendant manufacturer for 
personal injury.  Id. at 31-32 (citing Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S 51, 63-64 
(2002)).  Finally, he cites Locke, 529 U.S. at 108, in which the Court described as “artificial” 
the presumption against preemption, and consequently refused to apply it.  Id. at 32. 
 91. Id. at 32. 
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States’ regulatory autonomy alike, who consider the presumption an 
important judicial check on the balance of federal and state power, is the 
way in which the Court ignored entirely its application in its holding in 
Buckman, where it declared its inapplicability without ever providing a 
satisfying explanation as to why it reached that conclusion.92  The result is 
that advocates of the presumption may, in recent years, have rightly felt as if 
its legitimacy has been on shaky ground.  However, in Wyeth, the Court 
revived its support for the principle, stating that it “rel[ies] on the 
presumption because respect for the States as ‘independent sovereigns in 
our federal system’ leads [it] to assume that ‘Congress does not cavalierly 
pre-empt state-law causes of action.’”93 
B. The Faces of Federal Preemption 
1. Express Preemption 
Federal preemption falls into two primary categories based on 
Congress’ intent: express and implied.94  Express preemption occurs when 
Congress’ intent regarding the preemptive effect of legislation is apparent 
on the face of legislation, and includes explicit language “call[ing] for the 
displacement or nullification of state law in specified circumstances.”95  In 
these instances, Congress is thought to have “‘unmistakably [so] ordained’ 
that its enactments alone are to regulate” a sphere of activity, and that, 
consequently, “state laws regulating that aspect. . .must fall.”96  The 
Supreme Court has recognized as valid the express preemption of state 
authority, so long as it falls “within constitutional limits,” in that Congress’ 
exercise of preemptive authority was done pursuant to one of its enumerated 
powers.97  In 2007, approximately 350 federal statutes expressly preempted 
state law.98 
This form of “jurisdiction-stripping” occurs regardless of whether a 
state’s regulatory efforts conflict with the federal law at issue.99  Because of 
the fact that express preemption can apply even when there is no conflict 
 
 92. Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 347-48 (2001). 
 93. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1195 n.3 (2009) (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 
518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)). 
 94. Gardbaum, supra note 70, at 776. 
 95. UNTEREINER, supra note 90, at 159. 
 96. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977) (quoting Florida Avocado 
Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963)). 
 97. Pacific Gas & Elec. v. Energy Res. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 203-04 (1983). 
 98. JAMES T. O’REILLY, FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW: LEGISLATION, 
REGULATION AND LITIGATION 2 (2006). 
 99. Gardbaum, supra note 70, at 771 (arguing that “preemption resolves a ‘false 
conflict’ [because] there is only one valid law governing the issue, namely the federal”). 
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between a federal and state law, some scholars have argued for the 
recognition of a second constitutional basis for federal preemption within 
the Necessary and Proper Clause,100 which instructs Congress “[t]o make all 
laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the 
foregoing power. . . .”101 
2. Implied Preemption 
Congress’ intent to preempt state authority need not be expressly stated 
to be effective; instead, it can be implied from the character of the federal 
law or regulatory scheme.  This “implied” preemption falls into two 
categories.  The first, field preemption, arises when state action touches 
upon a field of law that Congress has intended (either expressly or impliedly) 
to exclude from state regulation.102  One factor indicating this intent is when 
the federal government’s interest in the class of regulation is “so pervasive 
as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the 
States to supplement it.”103  It may also be found where the “Act of 
Congress. . .touch[es] a field in which the federal interest is so dominant 
that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state 
laws on the same subject,” or the “object sought to be obtained by the 
federal law and the character of obligations imposed by it may reveal the 
same purpose.”104 
The second category, conflict preemption, is itself divisible into two 
classes: “ordinary” or “obstacle” preemption and “impossibility” 
preemption.105  Ordinary conflict preemption arises when a state action, 
whether it is regulatory or judicial in nature, “stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress.”106  The Court has applied the theory of ordinary conflict 
preemption as a means of stripping states of their rulemaking authority in a 
 
 100. See id. at 782 (Gardbaum has famously argued that supremacy and preemption are 
entirely separate in nature, the first deriving from the Supremacy Clause, and the second 
deriving from the Necessary and Proper Clause.); Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and 
Institutional Choice, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 727, 735-37 (2008) [hereinafter Merrill, Preemption] 
(discussing the Necessary and Proper Clause as possible authority for Congress to displace or 
preempt state law). 
 101. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
 102. Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152-53 (1982). 
 103. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). 
 104. Id. 
 105. UNTEREINER, supra note 90, at 266-67. 
 106. Pacific Gas & Elec. v. Energy Res. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 204 (1983) (quoting 
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). 
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variety of contexts.107  However, while the general rule regarding when 
ordinary conflict preemption applies seems basic enough, the determination 
of whether a conflict does in fact exist is not always quite as clear. 
The Supreme Court has traditionally used a two-step process for 
determining whether a conflict exists between federal and state law.  First, 
the reviewing court must “ascert[ain] the construction” of the statutes to 
determine the law’s primary purpose.108  When a state court has construed 
a statute, the reviewing court’s work is made significantly easier, because it 
will defer to the state court construction as authoritative.109  However, after 
the law’s purpose is determined, the court’s work becomes increasingly 
difficult.  The reviewing court will then address the “constitutional question” 
of whether the state’s action conflicts with the federal statute.110  Because 
conflict is a matter of degree, this question turns on “the extent of the 
inconsistency between state and federal law and whether that amount is 
sufficient, under the Supremacy Clause, to warrant preemption.”111 
The second form in which conflict preemption appears is “impossibility 
preemption.”112  This occurs in those instances where it is “impossible for 
a. . .party to comply with both state and federal law.”113  In these instances, 
the reviewing court’s work is arguably easiest, because “[a] holding of 
federal exclusion of state law is inescapable and requires no inquiry into 
congressional design. . . .”114  The Court has on several occasions 
addressed peripherally the subject of impossibility preemption; however, few 
of its decisions have turned on a finding of impossibility.115 
 
 107. See, e.g., Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 348, 353 (2001) 
(holding that “fraud-on-the-[agency]” claims brought against manufacturers of medical 
devices would “exert an extraneous pull on the scheme established by Congress, and [are] 
therefore pre-empted by that scheme”); Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 65 (2002) 
(stating that, “[o]f course, if a state common-law claim directly conflicted with a federal 
regulation promulgated under the [Federal Boat Safety] Act . . . pre-emption would occur”). 
 108. Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 644 (1971). 
 109. See id. (discussing an example of the U.S. Supreme Court deferring to the 
authoritative construction of an Arizona statute after the Arizona Supreme Court consistently 
adhered to that construction of its legislation). 
 110. Id. at 649. 
 111. UNTEREINER, supra note 90, at 269. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 899 (quoting English v. Gen. Elec. 
Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990)).  See Florida Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 
(1963) (explaining that impossibility preemption has also been described as arising when 
“compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility”). 
 114. Florida Avocado Growers, 373 U.S. at 142. 
 115. See, e.g., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984) (holding a state law 
attempting to undercut a rule created by Congress violated the Supremacy Clause); Bibb v. 
Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520, 521-22 (1959) (discussing whether a state statute 
requiring the use of a specific type of rear fender mudguard on trucks and trailers conflicts 
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IV.  ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES AND FEDERAL PREEMPTION 
Although federal administrative agencies have been a part of our 
scheme of national government since George Washington’s administration, 
the birth of the modern administrative era is commonly thought to have 
begun with the creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) in 
1887.116  The ICC’s success in regulating the railroad industry was “crucial 
to the nation’s development,” and inspired Congress to further capitalize on 
the administrative agency model.117  Throughout the course of the twentieth 
century, Congress delegated an increasing share of its lawmaking power to 
federal administrative agencies, granting to them regulatory authority over a 
wide array of industries and activities, including food and drugs, methods of 
competition, freight and shipping, radio, securities, labor relations, airlines, 
the environment, social insurance programs, and consumer fraud, to name 
but a few.118  Today, as testament to our nation’s “enchantment”119 with the 
administrative agency model, our nation has in place hundreds of federal 
agencies charged with administering countless federal statutes.120  The 
vastness of the responsibility entrusted to these agencies is made apparent 
by the fact that in 2001, federal agencies issued 4,132 final rules—handily 
eclipsing the 108 bills passed by Congress and signed into law that same 
year.121  Further, the cost of running these agencies is staggering, 
amounting to over $850 billion that same year, which amounts to 8.4% of 
2001’s U.S. gross domestic product.122 
 
with the Commerce Clause); Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 380 (1946) (discussing 
Congress’ power to regulate commerce and that the degree of a state statute’s interference 
with that commerce will be evaluated by federal courts to determine whether the burden on 
interstate commerce makes the statute unconstitutional); McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 
115, 117 (1913) (stating that “Congressional regulation does not exclude state regulation 
except so far as the former, lawfully exercised, conflicts with the latter”); Union Bridge Co. v. 
United States, 204 U.S. 364, 401 (1907) (holding that “Congress has power to protect 
navigation on all waterways of the United States against unreasonable obstructions, even 
those created under the sanction of a State,” and “an order to so alter” the unreasonable 
obstruction does not amount to a taking of private property for public use).  See also 
UNTEREINER, supra note 90, at 269-70. 
 116. RONALD A. CASS, COLIN S. DIVER & JACK M. BEERMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 3 (5th ed. 2006). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 3-4. 
 119. Id. at 4. 
 120. The White House, Federal Agencies & Commissions, http://www.whitehouse.gov/our-
government/federal-agencies-and-commissions (last visited Apr. 26, 2010). 
 121. CLYDE WAYNE CREWS, JR., TEN THOUSAND COMMANDMENTS: AN ANNUAL SNAPSHOT OF 
THE FEDERAL REGULATORY STATE 1 (2002), http://www.cato.org/tech/pubs/10kc_2002.pdf. 
 122. Id. at 2. 
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The Court has in several respects played an important role in this 
redistribution of power.123  First, it set a standard of review that prohibits the 
imposition by the courts of rulemaking procedures exceeding those outlined 
by Congress in the Administrative Procedure Act.124  Second, it granted 
administrative agencies discretion in deciding which procedures to use when 
engaging in rulemaking.125  Finally, it introduced the Chevron doctrine, an 
often-cited policy granting judicial deference to agency interpretations of 
ambiguous statutory language.126 
The rise of the modern administrative state has provided Congress with 
yet another means of exercising its authority to enact laws that displace or 
prevent entirely their state-law analogues.  As a consequence of the Court’s 
holding that “[f]ederal regulations have no less pre-emptive effect than 
federal statutes,”127 these lawmaking bodies have been empowered with 
putting into play expansive regulations that are capable of interrupting the 
achievement of state public health objectives. 
The redistribution of rulemaking authority from a Congress made up of 
elected officials, to anonymous bureaucracies with little to no public 
accountability, gives rise to “unique concerns” when agencies assert the 
power to preempt state law in the absence of an explicit congressional 
grant, especially when it is coupled with the deferential posture adopted by 
the Court toward agency decision-making.128  These concerns, in turn, lead 
to “critical questions” regarding whether administrative agencies have the 
expertise necessary to justify supplanting a body of state law, and whether 
federal regulatory bodies or the states are better positioned to respond to 
the particular needs of their citizens within the twin realms of health and 
safety.129  A reexamination of the constitutional basis for the preemptive 
authority of administrative agencies, as well as the Court’s review of that 
authority, is therefore warranted. 
A. The Delegation of Preemptive Authority to Administrative Agencies 
It is generally accepted that the Necessary and Proper Clause grants 
Congress the authority, within constitutional limits, to delegate its legislative 
 
 123. Lisa Kinney Helvin, Administrative Preemption in Areas of Traditional State Authority, 2 
CHARLESTON L. REV. 617, 618 (2008). 
 124. Id. at 618 n.2 (citing Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 548 
(1978)). 
 125. Id. (citing NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 291-92, 295 (1974)). 
 126. Id. at 619 n.3 (citing Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 
844-45 (1984)). 
 127. Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982). 
 128. Helvin, supra note 123, at 619. 
 129. Id. 
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power to administrative agencies.130  The Court has consistently held that 
Congress’ power to issue laws with preemptive effect may attach to this 
delegation.131  And while the permissible boundaries of that delegation are 
unclear, commentators argue that, at the minimum, those regulations issued 
by federal administrative agencies that conflict with state law must “have the 
force and effect of federal law,” and “must have been adopted ‘in 
Pursuance’ of the Constitution” to have preemptive effect.132  And while 
some argue that administrative agencies are unable to issue “Laws” as 
understood in a constitutional sense and that they are therefore unable to 
tap the Supremacy Clause’s guarantee of preemptive authority,133 the 
 
 130. Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section I: From Nondelegation to Exclusive 
Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2129-31 (2004) (citing U.S. CONST. art. 1, §8, cl. 18, 
which states, in relevant part, “[Congress shall have the power to] make all Laws which shall 
be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other 
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any 
Department or Officer thereof.”). 
 131. See, e.g., Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S. Ct. 1559, 1572-73 (2007) 
(holding that the National Bank Act preempted state-law banking regulations, and that the 
Act’s preemptive effect extended to those regulations issued by the Office of the Comptroller); 
Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 868 (2000) (holding that a federal regulation 
allowing the automobile industry a time period to phase in passive restraints preempted state 
tort claims built on the theory that failure to install air bags was negligent); CSX Transp., Inc. v. 
Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 675 (1993) (holding that a federal regulation setting maximum 
train speeds preempts state-law claims that train speed was negligently fast); City of New York 
v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57, 66 (1988) (holding that FCC regulations addressing cable television 
signal standards preempted stricter state regulations); Hillsborough County v. Automated 
Med. Labs., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985) (“We have held repeatedly that state laws can be pre-
empted by federal regulations as well as by federal statutes.”); Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. 
Crisp., 467 U.S. 691, 699-700 (1984) (holding that FCC regulations prohibiting the 
alteration of out-of-state television transmissions preempted the application of state advertising 
regulations); Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 170 (1982) (holding that 
a Federal Home Loan Bank Board’s regulation preempted apposite state common law); and 
United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 381-82 (1961) (holding that a state law regarding the 
calculation of deficiency judgments on foreclosure was preempted by a Veteran’s 
Administration regulation addressing in particular government-insured mortgages). 
 132. Merrill, Preemption, supra note 100, at 762. 
 133. See id. at 761. Thomas Merrill explains that “[o]ne can question as an original matter 
whether [it] is correct” to assume that Congress may delegate its authority to issue laws with 
preemptive effect, since the Supremacy Clause grants the power of preemption to only “[t]his 
Constitution,” “the Laws of the United States,” and “Treaties.”  Id.  Some argue that since 
regulations do not maintain the level of “concurrence by representative institutions” inherent to 
federal treaties, statutes and the Constitution, the actions of administrative agencies cannot 
satisfy the criteria for triggering preemptive effect.  Id. (citing Bradford R. Clark, Separation of 
Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1355-67(2001)).  However, 
Merrill points out that the Court effectively nixed this argument when it held that the term 
“Laws” includes “both federal statutes themselves and federal regulations that are properly 
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character and sheer number of the Court’s decisions affirming that ability 
give rise to the conclusion that there is a solid argument “in support of the 
idea that agency action can qualify as ‘Laws of the United States’ for 
Supremacy Clause purposes.”134 
When administrative agencies issue regulations that propose to have 
preemptive effect even in the absence of a conflict between state and 
federal law, it may be even less difficult to rationalize their compliance with 
the constitutional requirements for validity.  As discussed previously, while 
the Supremacy Clause is most often cited as the source of Congress’ 
preemptive authority, some scholars conclude that the Necessary and 
Proper Clause provides another source for the power to preempt.135  As 
Thomas Merrill explains, through the application of a basic syllogism: “If 
Congress can expressly preempt, and if it also has the power under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause to delegate legislative authority to agencies, 
then it would follow that Congress can delegate legislative authority to 
agencies to preempt.”136  This leads to the conclusion that, when an 
administrative agency’s preemptive power does not stem from the 
Supremacy Clause, but instead from another constitutional source, that 
agency’s actions are not required to comply with the clause’s strictures in 
order to maintain their preemptive effect. 
But it is exactly this type of activity—the independent pronouncement by 
federal administrative agencies that their regulations displace or supplant 
state law—that so often gives pause to observers of our regulatory state.137  
This may be especially so because, throughout the past decade, 
administrative agencies have made these pronouncements with increasing 
frequency,138 causing some to comment that agencies are “flexing their 
preemptive muscles.”139  In 2003, for example, the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency published a “Preemption Determination and 
Order” in the Federal Register expressly declaring that Georgia’s consumer 
protections laws that conflicted with federal regulations governing mortgage 
 
adopted in accordance with statutory authorization.”  Id. (quoting City of New York, 486 U.S. 
at 63). 
 134. Id. at 761-62. 
 135. Specifically, scholars posit that the Necessary and Proper Clause is the source of 
Congress’ ability to expressly preempt state law in the absence of any conflict.  See, e.g., id. at 
766-67; Gardbaum, supra note 70, at 782. 
 136. Merrill, Preemption, supra note 100, at 766. 
 137. See Nina A. Mendelson, A Presumption Against Agency Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. 
REV. 695, 700 (2008). 
 138. See id. at 696-97, 699 (providing several examples detailing the ways in which 
agencies have declared the preemptive effect of their regulations). 
 139. Catherine M. Sharkey, The Fraud Caveat to Agency Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 
841, 841 (2008). 
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lenders owned by national banking firms.140  Similarly, in 2006, the 
Department of Homeland Security, to which Congress had granted the 
authority to oversee domestic high-risk chemical manufacturing facilities, 
proposed a rule that it said would preempt state law.141 
Although in both of these instances the preemptive effect of the agency’s 
regulations was settled in favor of the states, more recent activity within the 
Court has signaled a trend toward deferring to an agency’s interpretation of 
the preemptive effect of its issued regulations.142  In the realm of state 
products liability law, for example, every decision issued by the Supreme 
Court between 1992 and 2008, save one, has come out in favor of 
agencies that make unilateral determinations that a regulation or set of 
regulations preempted state law.143  Because of this trend, and the unique 
questions about federalism, sovereignty and institutional choice it inspires, it 
is helpful to review how deference is afforded to administrative agencies 
generally, and how that deference has factored into decisions regarding the 
preemptive authority of these bodies. 
B. Judicial Deference to Administrative Agency Action 
One of the reasons that the administrative agency model of government 
has been so successful may be the broad judicial deference afforded by the 
courts to agency action.  Federal agencies are charged with administering 
federal statutes so as to bring into effect Congress’ intent.  The problem, of 
course, is that Congress is not always forthcoming about what end it 
intends.  To bridge this frequent gap, federal courts defer to an 
administrative agency’s interpretation of ambiguous statutory language so 
long as that interpretation is “permissible.”144  However, a finding of 
permissibility alone does not end the inquiry. 
The amount of deference afforded to an agency’s interpretation of 
ambiguous statutory language depends largely on the form in which that 
interpretation appears.  When the interpretation is announced in a 
regulation that enjoys the force of law, heightened deference is warranted; 
however, where the interpretation in question did not result from a formal 
adjudication or rulemaking, it is not entitled to deference.145  Instead, these 
 
 140. Mendelson, supra note 137, at 695 (citing Preemption Determination and Order, 68 
Fed. Reg, 46,264, 46,264 (Aug. 5, 2003)). 
 141. Id. (citing Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards, 71 Fed. Reg. 78,276, 78,293 
(Dec. 28, 2006)). 
 142. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption: An Institutional Approach, 
76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 449, 471 (2008). 
 143. Id. 
 144. Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). 
 145. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).  The Supreme Court, in 
deciding a Labor Standards Act case, determined that some weight—but not absolute 
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interpretations are merely “‘entitled to respect’”. . .but only to the extent that 
those interpretations have the “‘power to persuade.’”146 
It is helpful to keep in mind these levels of judicial deference when 
considering the ways in which administrative agencies have asserted their 
own power to preempt state law, as well as the Court’s response to these 
averments.  Traditionally, the declarations of administrative agencies that 
their regulations have preemptive effects on state law have been analyzed in 
much the same way as interpretations of ambiguous statutory language.147  
However, while the Court has, as discussed supra, overwhelmingly deferred 
to agency decisions regarding preemption, it has failed to articulate a 
specific standard for considering the effect of agency preemption 
decisions.148  What has resulted is a mishmash approach to the preemption 
question as it applies to federal agencies, with standards of deference 
ranging from extremely149 to tacitly150 deferential. 
1. Arguments in Support of Agency Deference 
Navigating the way to an operative test for divining the length and 
breadth of judicial deference to agency preemption determinations does 
nothing to address the normative question of whether courts ought to do so 
in the first place.  Those who favor a deferential stance in relation to agency 
 
deference—could be given to an Administrator’s opinion regarding what constitutes on-call 
time.  Although the Administrator did not arrive at his conclusions by “trial in adversary form,” 
his opinions and interpretations were still “properly resort[ed] [to] for guidance.  In short, there 
may be circumstances where such an opinion might provide some persuasive value, but there 
will never be circumstances in which it will have the “power to control.”  Id. at 140. 
 146. Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (quoting Skidmore, 323 
U.S. at 140). 
 147. UNTEREINER, supra note 90, at 34. 
 148. Helvin, supra note 123, at 627.  In her discussion of the treatment of agency 
preemption decisions by the Supreme Court, Helvin explains that, prior to Chevron, the Court 
“applied an extremely deferential standard of review to agency determinations” that either the 
enabling statute or its regulations preempted state law.  Id. at 626.  Consequently, she notes, 
“[i]t might have seemed inevitable that, following . . . Chevron . . . the Court would formalize 
its deferential standard by explicitly extending Chevron deference to agency preemption 
decisions.”  Id. at 626-27.  However, in City of New York v. FCC, decided four years after 
Chevron, the Court did not accord the FCC Chevron deference, although it did ultimately 
defer to its decision.  City of New York v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57, 63 (1988); Helvin, supra note 
123, at 627. 
 149. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 154 (1982) (explaining that 
the operative inquiry in determining whether an agency’s regulation had preemptive effect was 
whether it intended its rule to preempt state law, and whether it had the delegated authority to 
do so). 
 150. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 496-97 (1996) (indicating first that 
agencies should be granted substantial deference in their interpretations that state law is 
preempted by regulation, but then engaging in a full statutory construction analysis). 
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interpretations of preemptive effect commonly cite the institutional expertise 
of these agencies and their administrators in support of their position.151  
Not only have these agencies developed institutional competence within 
their area of concentration, they argue, this competence has made them 
better suited than courts to recognize the potential for, and the 
consequences of, conflict between their regulatory schemes and state law.152  
Furthermore, the argument goes, it is not as if federal agencies are 
completely unburdened by the yoke of accountability.153  Quite to the 
contrary, although Congress could, “[w]ith the stroke of a pen. . .definitively 
answer the question of state common-law preemption,”154 both it and the 
President enjoy additional, less strenuous means of influencing agency 
decision-making, such as the withdrawal of agency funding,155 or the use of 
executive order.156 
2. Arguments Against Agency Deference 
Those who oppose a highly deferential standard for reviewing pro-
preemption agency interpretations argue that, all too often, agencies 
promote preemption as a means of increasing their institutional power, and 
seldom consider the effects on the federal-state balance.157  Thus, many of 
these attempts to preempt state law may “reflect a self-aggrandizing power 
grab more than reasoned policymaking.”158  The result, they say, is that 
“courts should actively police against self-interested administrative 
interpretations of ambiguous preemption provisions” lest they “permit 
 
 151. Helvin, supra note 123, at 631. 
 152. See id.; Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble: Federal Agencies and the 
Federalization of Tort Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 227, 252 (2007) (stating that “[g]iven their 
unique understanding of the ways in which state law interacts with a federal regulatory 
scheme, federal agencies may have a critical role to play in preemption determinations, either 
directly or in forcing Congress to confront the vexing issue of the displacement of state 
common law”). 
 153. Helvin, supra note 123, at 631 (citing Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 
102 MICH. L. REV. 737, 741 (2004)). 
 154. Sharkey, supra note 152, at 251. 
 155. See STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY: PROBLEMS, 
TEXT AND CASES 101 (2006). 
 156. For example, in 1999, President Bill Clinton issued an executive order that expressly 
instructed agencies to interpret federal statutes as preempting state law only in those 
circumstances where Congress included an express preemption provision, where there existed 
“some other clear evidence” that Congress intended it to preempt, or where there was actual 
conflict between federal and state law.  Exec. Order No. 13,132, 3 C.F.R. 208 (2000) 
reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 750-51 (2006). 
 157. Helvin, supra note 123, at 632-33. 
 158. Richard Frankel, Undue Deference, TRIAL, Nov. 2006, at 30, 34. 
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agencies to expand their jurisdictional and preemptive capabilities at the 
expense of the states.”159 
Critics further argue that, while it may be true that administrative 
agencies develop significant technical expertise within their particular 
regulatory demesnes, it does not necessarily follow that this knowledge 
brings with it an equally nuanced understanding of the federal-state 
balance.160  After all, the policy of judicial deference to agency 
interpretations was built upon the premise that, at least in regard to some 
questions, administrative agencies are better suited to answer than are the 
courts.161  However, it is difficult to imagine a situation in which a federal 
agency is by any means a greater expert on the execution of a particular 
state law than the state in which it originates.162  Similarly, it is unlikely that 
federal agencies, as opposed to the courts, better understand the expansive 
yet delicate interplay of issues that make up the Federalism debate, 
considering that courts are staffed by “generalist judges, who are,” out of 
necessity, “well-suited to balancing” the varying interests of federal and state 
government.163 
It is, perhaps, because of these reasons that critics emphasize the 
importance of keeping in play the presumption against preemption when 
courts consider this class of agency action.164  If the courts uniformly 
enforced the presumption, federal agencies would be required to show that 
Congress’ intention to preempt state law is “clear and manifest.”165  This 
requirement would result in the conveyance to the states of additional 
protections to assure that “regulatory autonomy” is not cavalierly displaced 
by “incidental” agency action.166 
Others posit that the best way to protect the presumption in light of the 
Court’s increasing deference to agency preemption determinations is 
through the application of the further requirement that Congress make a 
“clear statement” of its intent to preempt state law through the agency’s 
administration of a statute.167  The benefit of such a requirement, they say, is 
 
 159. Helvin, supra note 123, at 633. 
 160. Mendelson, supra note 137, at 710-11. 
 161. Frankel, supra note 158, at 32. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 32, 34. 
 164. Helvin, supra note 123, at 635 (stating that the application of the presumption is 
“frequently touted as [a] solution[]”). 
 165. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). 
 166. Mendelson, supra note 137, at 710. 
 167. See Helvin, supra note 123, at 635-36.  See also David S. Bogen, The Market 
Participant Doctrine and the Clear Statement Rule, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 543, 569-70 (2006) 
(expressing approval of the Supreme Court’s refusal to apply general federal provisions to the 
states absent a clear statement); Thomas W. Merrill, Rescuing Federalism After Raich: The 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
330 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY [Vol. 3:307 
that agencies would be capable of exercising preemptive authority only in 
those instances where political figures with true public accountability have 
acted.168  The political pressure resulting from such a procedural 
requirement would contribute to a more deliberate weighing of federal and 
state interests, and allow states targeted for preemption a better opportunity 
to prepare for and prevent the passage of preemptive statutes.169  Further, it 
does so without destroying the government’s discretion in determining 
institutional roles.170 
Yet, regardless of what deference the courts should afford agencies in 
their preemption determinations, the fact remains that, with escalating 
regularity, they do defer.171  The potential effects of this policy have come 
into increasingly stark relief in recent years, due to the work of scholars who 
point out a new trend in the pronouncement by agencies of these 
preemption determinations.  That trend features the delivery of agency 
interpretations favoring the displacement of state law not by way of the 
publication of a rule that has received notice and comment, but instead by 
means of a rule’s preamble.172  While there is no consensus regarding 
whether preambles are entitled to judicial deference, the trend has been 
identified as a potential strategy for effecting stealth tort reform by means of 
this “backdoor federalization.”173 
 
Case for Clear Statement Rules, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 823, 833 (2005) [hereinafter Merrill, 
Rescuing Federalism]; Larry J. Obhof, Federalism, I Presume? A Look at the Enforcement of 
Federalism Principles Through Presumptions and Clear Statement Rules, 2004 MICH. ST. L. 
REV. 123, 154-55 (2004). 
 168. Helvin, supra note 123, at 636. 
 169. Id. (quoting Merrill, Rescuing Federalism, supra note 167, at 833). 
 170. See Merrill, Preemption, supra note 100, at 767 (noting that “courts are as a rule 
better institutions to resolve preemption questions than agencies.  If we allow agencies to 
preempt based on a general grant of rulemaking authority, or an ambiguous grant of 
rulemaking authority, then the institutional choice question would in effect be decided by 
agencies and courts in collaboration . . . . [G]iven that there are general reasons to prefer 
courts to agencies in determining whether to preempt, it is better to leave the decision to 
substitute agencies for courts squarely with Congress.  Requiring a super-strong clear 
statement from Congress secures this result.”). 
 171. Sharkey, supra note 153, at 242. 
 172. Id.; see also Cristina Rodríguez, The FDA Preamble: A Backdoor to Federalization of 
Prescription Warning Labels?, 41 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 161, 169-71 (2007) (noting that the 
FDA changed its position on preemption from 2000 to 2006 by incorporating a statement of 
preemption in the preamble to its Statement on Human Drug Labeling). 
 173. See generally Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 
53 UCLA L. REV. 1353, 1358 (2006) (identifying a national trend toward increased 
federalization of statutory and regulatory schemes inspired by market protectionism, and 
discussing the evidence of collaboration between the branches of government to effect that 
outcome). 
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C. The Debate Illustrated: FDA, Pharmaceuticals, and Agency Preemption 
Even before the FDA’s birth in 1927,174 some of the nation’s first 
modern preemption cases to reach the Supreme Court addressed whether 
statutes governing food and drugs preempted state efforts at concurrent 
regulation.175  However, throughout most of the Twentieth Century, the 
preemption defense was employed sparingly within the Supreme Court.  
When it was, industry defendants were the ones who raised it.  It wasn’t until 
the last part of the century that preemption would emerge as a major 
defense strategy, and the FDA would become a champion for the 
displacement of state law in regard to pharmaceuticals litigation.  In Wyeth, 
though, the Court held for several reasons that the FDA’s pharmaceuticals 
labeling determinations did not preempt state-law tort claims.  First, the 
Court held that Congress did not make an express statement in the FDCA 
that indicated its intent that the FDA enjoy such sweeping authority.176  
Secondly, the Court found that the regulatory preamble in which the FDA 
announced its preemptive authority dramatically shifted the agency’s course 
and failed to openly allow notice and comment on its interpretation.177  
Third, it noted the important remedial function served by state-law tort 
claims.178  Finally, it noted the agency’s likely inability to sufficiently monitor 
the safety of consumers.179 
 
 174. Initially, the administration of the Pure Foods and Drugs Act of 1906 was entrusted to 
the USDA Bureau of Chemistry.  U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA History—Part I: The 1906 
Food and Drugs Act and Its Enforcement, http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/ 
Origin/ucm054819.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2010).  However, in 1927, the Bureau was 
reorganized into the Food, Drug, and Insecticide Administration, which was charged with 
regulating food and drugs, and a Bureau of Chemistry and Soils, which was charged with 
conducting research.  See U.S. Food & Drug Admin., About FDA: Significant Dates in U.S. 
Food and Drug Law History, http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/Milestones/ 
ucm128305.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 2010).  In 1930, the FDA’s official name was shorted 
to the Food and Drug Administration.  Id. 
 175. See generally McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115 (1913) (holding that a 
Wisconsin law requiring highly detailed labeling of glucose products was invalid because it 
came into conflict with federal labeling requirements and had the effect of infringing upon 
rights granted by the federal regulation); Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501 (1912) (holding that 
an Indiana statute mandating the disclosure of ingredients of foods offered for sale in Indiana 
in interstate commerce was valid because there was no conflict between the statute and 
federal regulations; the statute merely expanded on the federal regulations). 
 176. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1200-01 (2009). 
 177. Id. at 1201-02. 
 178. Id. at 1202. 
 179. Id. 
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1. FDA’s Changing Positions on Preemption 
Congress has not granted the FDA express authority to preempt state 
law relating to prescription pharmaceuticals.180  It is no surprise then that, 
before 2000, the FDA maintained that its regulations did not preempt state 
law tort claims, but instead set “minimum standards” for enforcement.181  
The agency’s interpretation regarding the preemptive effect of its 
prescription pharmaceutical labeling requirements were made evident in a 
1998 comment to regulations setting requirements for medication guides, in 
which the FDA stated that the agency’s regulations “were not intended to 
preclude the states from imposing additional labeling requirements,” but 
were merely a regulatory floor.182  The agency echoed its position two years 
later when it issued for comment a proposed rule outlining revised labeling 
requirements.183  There, the FDA again expressed its opinion that its 
proposed rule did not preempt state law,184 and that its adoption would 
result in “little, if any, impact” on “the distribution of power and 
responsibilities among the various levels of Government.”185 
The FDA abruptly changed course in 2006, resulting in “a seismic shift 
in FDA policy.”186  Throughout the notice and comment period for the 
proposed rule, the FDA was urged to interpret its labeling requirements as 
preempting state law.187  Further, the Bush Administration encouraged 
agencies to explore new ways of using the preemption defense as a means 
 
 180. O’REILLY, supra note 98, at 145.  Congress has, however, granted express preemptive 
effect to FDA’s labeling requirements for nonprescription drugs.  21 U.S.C. § 379r (2006). 
 181. Rodríguez, supra note 172, at 169 (explaining that prior to 2000 the FDA issued 
several statements indicating that its labeling requirements did not preempt state-law failure-
to-warn claims, but set a floor for standards).  See also Mary J. Davis, The Battle over Implied 
Preemption: Products Liability and the FDA, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1089, 1117-18 (2007) (discussing 
the FDA’s position against the preemption of state law in regard to its blood collection 
regulations).  C.f. Howard L. Dorfman, Vivian M. Quinn & Elizabeth A. Brophy, Presumption 
of Innocence: FDA’s Authority to Regulate the Specifics of Prescription Drug Labeling and the 
Preemption Debate, 61 Food & Drug L.J. 585, 590 (2006) (“Since at least 1991, [the] FDA 
has expressed that its prescription drug labeling determinations are both a floor and a ceiling 
regarding the sufficiency of safety-related information.”). 
 182. Prescription Drug Product Labeling; Medication Guide Requirements; Final Rule, 63 
Fed. Reg. 66,378, 66,384 (Dec. 1, 1998). 
 183. Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drugs and 
Biologics; Requirements for Prescription Drug Product Labels; Proposed Rule; 65 Fed. Reg. 
81,082, 81,082-83 (Dec. 22, 2000). 
 184. Id. at 81,103. 
 185. Id. 
 186. David A. Kessler & David V. Vladeck, A Critical Examination of the FDA’s Efforts to 
Preempt Failure-to-Warn Claims, 96 GEO. L.J. 461, 463-64 (2008). 
 187. Rodríguez, supra note 172, at 170. 
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of curbing industry tort liability.188  It is perhaps because of these external 
pressures that, when the FDA published its final rule in 2006, it for the first 
time included language stating that the FDCA189 preempted “conflicting or 
contrary State law.”190  In doing so, it announced that it now interpreted its 
labeling requirements as “establish[ing] both a ‘floor’ and a ‘ceiling,’” citing 
as its primary justification the potential for harm that can result from 
“defensive labeling.”191  However, the agency further opined that state 
claims based on a drug manufacturer’s failure to comply with the FDA’s 
requirements were not preempted.192 
The 2006 preamble was attacked as the epitome of the “backdoor 
federalization” decried by critics.193  Though some suggest that the 
preamble should have been granted broad deference by the courts,194 
others argued that the deference afforded it should have been minimal,195 
or that deference was completely unwarranted.196  And while some critics 
cited in support of their arguments against deference objections to stealth 
tort reform,197 most instead chose to focus on what they saw as the 
inevitable outcome of the acceptance of the FDA’s position: that individuals 
would be left without legal recourse for injuries sustained as the result of 
negligence, and thus severely impaired in their ability to vindicate their rights 
within the courts.  And it was that argument in particular that may have 
 
 188. See generally James T. O’Reilly, Losing Deference in the FDA’s Second Century: 
Judicial Review, Politics, and a Diminished Legacy of Expertise, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 939 
(2008) (arguing that the politicization of FDA during George W. Bush’s administration 
resulted in a shift away from judicial deference to the agency). 
 189. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-99 (2006). 
 190. Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and 
Biological Products and Draft Guidances and Two Guidances for Industry on the Content and 
Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and Biological Products; Final Rule and 
Notices, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3934 (Jan. 24, 2006). 
 191. Id. at 3935. 
 192. Id. at 3936. 
 193. Issacharoff & Sharkey, supra note 173, at 1358; Rodríquez, supra note 172, at 161; 
Sharkey, supra note 153, at 228. 
 194. See generally Christine H. Kim, The Case for Preemption of Prescription Drug Failure-
to-Warn Claims, 62 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 399, 399-401 (2007) (arguing that the Court should 
defer to the preemption determination found in the 2006 preamble not only because the 
evidence shows that FDA was moving in the direction of such a position, but also because 
state law tort claims are disruptive to the federal regulatory scheme). 
 195. See id. at 414, 416. 
 196. O’REILLY, supra note 98, at 145. 
 197. See Margaret H. Clune, Stealth Tort Reform: How the Bush Administration’s 
Aggressive Use of Preemption Doctrine Hurts Consumers, in CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE 
REGULATION WHITE PAPER, at 1, 10 (Ctr. for Progressive Regulation, CPR White Paper No. 403, 
2004), http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/preemption.pdf (suggesting that “consumers 
should be outraged at [FDA’s] clandestine attempts to erode their legal protections”). 
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carried the day in Wyeth for those who opposed the view that the FDA’s 
labeling requirements had preemptive effect on state law tort claims. 
In Wyeth, Justice Stevens noted that when the preamble was 
disseminated in 2006, it was done so “without offering States or other 
interested parties notice or opportunity for comment,” stating that “[t]he 
agency’s views on state law are inherently suspect in light of this procedural 
failure.”198  Justice Stevens also pointed out the irony of the FDA’s sudden 
shift in policy, which “reverse[d] the FDA’s own longstanding position 
without providing a reasoned explanation, including any discussion of how 
state law has interfered with the FDA’s regulation of drug labeling during 
decades of coexistence.”199 
2. The Importance of an Available Remedy 
When considering preemption cases, the Court has often applied 
greater scrutiny in those instances where the preemption of state law would 
result in the complete denial of judicial recourse to injured plaintiffs.  In 
Silkwood, for example, the Court considered whether plaintiffs may bring 
negligence claims against operators of nuclear power plants, despite the 
fact that the Atomic Energy Act preempts the ability of states to regulate the 
safety aspects of nuclear energy, and that the defendant complied with 
federal safety requirements.200  There, after reviewing the Atomic Energy Act, 
Justice White, writing for the majority, found that: 
[T]here is no indication that Congress even seriously considered precluding 
the use of [state law] remedies either when it enacted the Atomic Energy Act 
in 1954 or when it amended it in 1959.  This silence takes on added 
significance in light of Congress’ failure to provide any federal remedy for 
persons injured by such conduct.  It is difficult to believe that Congress 
would, without comment, remove all means of judicial recourse for those 
injured by illegal conduct.”201 
Because of these reasons, the Court held that the Atomic Energy Act did not 
preclude the plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages.202 
Similarly, in Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, the Court considered whether 
the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) preempted 
state-law claims against manufacturers of products that had been approved 
by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which had been charged by 
Congress with the task of administering the act.203  Citing its earlier decision 
 
 198. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1201 (2009). 
 199. Id. 
 200. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 240-42 (1984). 
 201. Id. at 251. 
 202. Id. at 258. 
 203. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 434-35 (2005). 
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in Silkwood, the Court stated that “[t]he long history of tort litigation against 
manufacturers of poisonous substances adds force to the basic presumption 
against pre-emption.  If Congress had intended to deprive injured parties of 
a long available form of compensation, it surely would have expressed that 
intent more clearly.”204 
The Court’s tendency to consider the availability of relief for those 
plaintiffs for whom compensation would be precluded entirely by 
preemption may therefore weigh against the FDA’s assertion that its labeling 
requirements preempt state law failure-to-warn claims.  After all, the FDCA 
does not include a federal remedy for those who are injured because of a 
drug manufacturer’s negligence.205  Neither does the Court look favorably 
on the efforts of administrative agencies to “read in” federal remedial 
schemes in the absence of compelling evidence that Congress intended for 
a statute to provide one.206  Therefore, even if the FDA were to announce 
that there did exist a federal private right of action for those injured as the 
result of negligent labeling practices, it is unlikely that the remedy would be 
recognized by the courts.207 
Further, the 2006 preamble outlined six broad classes of state law 
claims that it considered preempted by its labeling requirements.208  The list 
 
 204. Id. at 449. 
 205. See In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 2d 776, 788 (E.D. La. 2007) 
(“Because there are no federal remedies for individuals harmed by prescription drugs, a 
finding of implied preemption in these cases would abolish state-law remedies and would, in 
effect, render legally impotent those who sustain injuries from defective prescription drugs.”); 
Wack v. Lederle Labs., 666 F. Supp. 123, 128 (N.D. Ohio 1987) (“Congress has not 
provided any federal remedies for collecting damages for inadequate labeling [sic] and design 
defects in [] products liability cases.”). 
 206. Sharkey, supra note 153, at 228-29 (“[A]gencies’ hands are tied by judicial tether.”). 
 207. Id. at 242. 
 208. Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and 
Biological Products and Draft Guidances and Two Guidances for Industry on the Content and 
Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and Biological Products; Final Rule and 
Notices, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3935-36 (Jan. 24, 2006). 
FDA believes that at least the following claims would be preempted by its regulation of 
prescription drug labeling: (1) Claims that a drug sponsor breached an obligation to 
warn by failing to put in Highlights or otherwise emphasize any information the 
substance of which appears anywhere in the labeling; (2) claims that a drug sponsor 
breached an obligation to warn by failing to include in an advertisement any 
information the substance of which appears anywhere in the labeling, in those cases 
where a drug’s sponsor has used Highlights consistently with FDA draft guidance 
regarding the ‘brief summary’ in direct-to-consumer advertising . . . ; (3) claims that a 
sponsor breached an obligation to warn by failing to include contraindications or 
warnings that are not supported by evidence that meets the standards set forth in this 
rule . . . ; (4) claims that a drug sponsor breached an obligation to warn by failing to 
include a statement in labeling or in advertising, the substance of which had been 
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is so expansive that it is hard to imagine an instance in which any 
negligence claim that even indirectly challenged the sufficiency of an FDA-
approved prescription drug label could proceed.  The result was then that if 
the FDA’s drug labeling requirements were found to have preemptive effect 
on state law tort claims, individuals who were injured because of the 
inadequacy of labeling would have been left without any judicial recourse. 
The Court’s explanation for its sensitivity to the availability of remedies 
for injured plaintiffs in Silkwood and Bates easily translates into the realm of 
pharmaceuticals labeling.  First, there is no evidence that Congress ever 
intended for the FDCA to strip individuals of legal compensation for injuries 
sustained as the result of a drug manufacturer’s negligent labeling 
practices.209  To the contrary, in the 1997 amendments to the FDCA, 
Congress seemed to indicate its intent that the FDA and the States 
collaborate on the regulation of drugs when it included a provision that 
required the manufacturers of drugs already approved by the FDA to obtain 
state licensing to distribute their products.210  Second, the FDA never 
indicated in the 2006 preamble that Congress intended labeling regulations 
to preempt state law,211 thus buttressing the argument against deferring to 
the FDA’s unilateral declaration of the preemptive effect of its labeling 
requirements.212 
Although Justice Stevens mentioned only briefly the importance of an 
available remedy in his opinion in Wyeth, he notes the importance of the 
“distinct compensatory function” served by state law tort claims that “may 
motivate injured persons to come forward with information.”213  This, he 
states, in combination with the deterrent effects that adverse judgments have 
on the behaviors of those companies that market and distribute dangerous 
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products, shows that “FDA traditionally regarded state law as a 
complementary form of drug regulation.”214 
3. The Relevance of an Agency’s Inability to Prevent Harm 
Both recent litigation215 and independent studies216 have indicated that 
the FDA is plagued by institutional shortcomings that seriously compromise 
its ability to prevent the very harms that preemption would leave 
uncompensated.  These indications gives rise to fundamental questions 
about whether the FDA is at all capable of sole regulation of the drug 
marketplace, and if not, whether the agency’s recent assertion of its 
authority to do so should be granted deference.217 
Both the Institute of Medicine and the FDA’s own employees agree that 
the agency lacks the resources it needs to adequately monitor the safety of 
drugs once they pass through the approval process.218  Considering that the 
FDA’s rigorous pre-approval process “cannot, and is not designed to, 
uncover risks that are relatively rare or have long latency periods,”219 that 
most post-release adverse events go unreported,220 and that most drug-
related injuries occur during the post-release period,221 the potential for 
these injuries appears to be significant.  Manufacturers exacerbate the risks 
of post-release adverse drug events by the direct-to-consumer marketing of 
prescription pharmaceuticals.222  The result of this practice is that, within 
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weeks of release, a drug is “prescribed by thousands of doctors to perhaps 
hundreds of thousands of patients.”223  These illustrations of agency failure 
militate against the preemption of state tort claims, which remain, in the 
absence of a federal remedy, the only source of compensation to those 
injured as a result of the FDA’s recognized failure to identify drug risks. 
The Wyeth Court pointed to these perceived shortcomings when it 
discussed the important role that state-law tort suits play in the regulation of 
prescription drugs, stating that the “FDA has limited resources to monitor the 
11,000 drugs on the market,”224 and noting specifically that when 
Phenergan was approved in 1955, an advisory committee report declared 
“conclusively that the. . .budget and staff of the Food and Drug 
Administration are inadequate to permit the discharge of its existing 
responsibilities for the protection of the American public.’”225  “State tort 
suits,” the Court said, “uncover unknown drug hazards and provide 
incentives for drug manufacturers to disclose safety risks promptly.”226  
These claims—especially when they are combined into mass tort suits—may 
in many ways “mirror[] the development of public administrative agencies” 
in that they “wield significant power over human lives and resources.”227 
V.  THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF WYETH V. LEVINE ON PUBLIC HEALTH POLICY 
Wyeth v. Levine is the newest chapter in a story that has been told since 
our nation’s earliest days.  That story pits federal supremacy against state 
sovereignty in a tug-of-war battle over the right to determine when safety is 
safe enough.  However, in Wyeth, its players brought with them new 
strategies for gaining ground.  Foremost among these was the FDA’s 
attempt to declare its preemptive authority by means of regulatory 
preamble, the newest trend in “the increasing federalization of law 
governing products regulated in the national market.”228  The use of these 
preambles as attempts by administrative agencies to assert their preemptive 
intent breathed new life into strategies to relieve commercial companies 
from the strain brought about by adverse court settlements for state law tort 
claims.  In addition, Wyeth revived debates that, in recent years, had been 
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thought to be somewhat settled, such as those questions that address what 
deference is due to federal agency action. 
The stakes, however, were far greater in Wyeth.  Had the FDA gained 
the upper hand in that contest, the agency’s determinations as to whether 
prescription drug labeling was sufficient would have precluded entirely any 
attempts by injured parties to win legal compensation for their injuries.  The 
result would have been that drug manufacturers would have been able to 
escape entirely all accountability in the nation’s courts for their negligent 
labeling practices, and answered only to a solitary federal agency whose 
ability to ensure the safety of the American people may be seriously limited, 
so long as the FDA had approved the drugs, and their labels, as safe. 
Aside from the federalism concerns that would have been raised if 
Wyeth had succeeded in its appeal, public health advocates would almost 
certainly have found one of their most effective tools for effecting sweeping 
public health objectives dulled.  As discussed in Part II, and in the Court’s 
majority opinion in Wyeth, state law tort claims have, since our country’s 
earliest days, played a significant role in the development and 
implementation of public health policy.229  First, tort litigation creates a 
powerful financial incentive for industries to investigate more rigorously the 
risks and benefits of their products before releasing them to the public.230  
Second, at least in regard to pharmaceuticals, tort claims can bring to light 
important safety information that has been previously unreleased by 
manufacturers, and which may therefore be unavailable to the FDA.231  
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it may serve to fill the regulatory gap 
that critics argue exists in the FDA’s oversight of drug safety, thus adding an 
additional layer of security to consumers who are privy to only the 
information available to them via drug company disclosures and doctor’s 
orders. 
The importance of Wyeth is underscored by the fact that, regardless of 
how the Court decided the case, it was poised to change the face of public 
health policy in the United States.  As discussed, if the Court had found in 
favor of Wyeth, holding that the FDA’s labeling requirements preempted 
state law tort suits, there would have been virtually no recourse for those 
individuals who were injured as the result of the negligent labeling practices 
of manufacturers.  What’s more, if the Court had gone much further, and 
held that the FDA’s attempt to unilaterally declare its preemptive authority by 
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means of regulatory preamble was effective, it could have resulted in the 
sharp curtailing of state law tort litigation involving any number of industries 
regulated by the federal government.  As noted, several federal 
administrative agencies have attempted to use regulatory preambles as a 
means of asserting the preemptive authority of their promulgated rules.232 
If this strategy had been affirmed in Wyeth, it is likely that corporations 
and industries, in an effort to avoid legal liability for their negligent acts, 
would bring to bear against administrative agencies significant pressure to 
use regulatory preambles as a means of asserting preemptive authority.  
This, in turn, could have had the effect of chilling the use of state law tort 
claims for public health purposes, forcing advocates to resort entirely to a 
legislative process that is criticized as an inefficient means of guarding 
human health and safety.  That is, by setting a standard of deference that 
validates agency interpretations that occur outside of formal rulemaking, 
and in the absence of a congressional signal indicating the intent to 
preempt state law, it may be that other regulated industries would have 
eventually found themselves free from the burden of having to account 
within the nation’s courts for their negligent actions. 
However, this was not the case in Wyeth.  Instead, the Court held that 
the FDA’s labeling determinations are not conclusive on the issue of whether 
pharmaceuticals companies failed to provide consumers with adequate 
warnings regarding their products.233  This appears to have resolved what 
was emerging as a nationwide split regarding the preemptive effect of the 
FDA’s labeling requirements.234  Because the possibility of unfavorable 
determinations can dissuade prospective plaintiffs from bringing claims, it is 
possible that the resolution of this point in favor of consumers could have 
the effect of encouraging injured parties to pursue compensation from 
negligent pharmaceuticals companies for injuries sustained as the result of 
inadequate warning labels on drugs.  By affirming the use of state law tort 
claims as a legitimate method of attaining relief for negligent labeling 
practices, individuals will be allowed to continue influencing industry 
behaviors that affect the public health.  This could have huge implications 
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for the ways in which public health advocates use the nation’s courts to put 
into motion their agendas.  Where advocates may have once found their 
efforts to indirectly regulate the pharmaceuticals industry frustrated by a lack 
of legal clarity regarding the preemptive effect of the FDA’s labeling 
determinations, the Court’s affirmation of both the legitimacy of these 
claims, and the established practice of using state-law suits to affect public 
health outcomes, may help to usher in new attempts to change the 
behaviors of companies whose products and actions so directly influence the 
wellbeing of individuals. 
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